Greater Expectations?

Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are key tools in the construction of lightweight authentication and key exchange protocols. So far, all existing PUF-based authentication protocols follow the same paradigm: A resource-constrained prover, holding a PUF, wants to authenticate to a resource-rich verifier, who has access to a database of pre-measured PUF challenge-response pairs (CRPs). In this paper we consider application scenarios where all previous PUF-based authentication schemes fail to work: The verifier is resource-constrained (and holds a PUF), while the prover is resource-rich (and holds a CRP-database). We construct the first and efficient PUF-based authentication protocol for this setting, which we call converse PUF-based authentication. We provide an extensive security analysis against passive adversaries, show that a minor modification also allows for authenticated key exchange and propose a concrete instantiation using controlled Arbiter PUFs

Authenticated storage using small trusted hardware

A major security concern with outsourcing data storage to third-party providers is authenticating the integrity and freshness of data. State-of-the-art software-based approaches require clients to maintain state and cannot immediately detect forking attacks, while approaches that introduce limited trusted hardware (e.g., a monotonic counter) at the storage server achieve low throughput. This paper proposes a new design for authenticating data storage using a small piece of high-performance trusted hardware attached to an untrusted server. The proposed design achieves significantly higher throughput than previous designs. The server-side trusted hardware allows clients to authenticate data integrity and freshness without keeping any mutable client-side state. Our design achieves high performance by parallelizing server-side authentication operations and permitting the untrusted server to maintain caches and schedule disk writes, while enforcing precise crash recovery and write access control

Transparent code authentication at the processor level

The authors present a lightweight authentication mechanism that verifies the authenticity of code and thereby addresses the virus and malicious code problems at the hardware level eliminating the need for trusted extensions in the operating system. The technique proposed tightly integrates the authentication mechanism into the processor core. The authentication latency is hidden behind the memory access latency, thereby allowing seamless on-the-fly authentication of instructions. In addition, the proposed authentication method supports seamless encryption of code (and static data). Consequently, while providing the software users with assurance for authenticity of programs executing on their hardware, the proposed technique also protects the software manufacturers’ intellectual property through encryption. The performance analysis shows that, under mild assumptions, the presented technique introduces negligible overhead for even moderate cache sizes

Multicentric case series of scuba diving fatalities: The role of intracardiac gaseous carbon dioxide in the forensic diagnosis.

Scuba diving fatalities post-mortem diagnosis presents a higher level of forensic complexity because of their occurrence in a non-natural human life environment. Scuba divers are equipped with diving gas to breathe underwater. It is essential for them to be fully trained in order to be able to manage their dive safely despite the varying increase of ambient pressure and temperature decrease. Throughout the dive, the inhaled diving gas is dissolved in the diver's tissues during the descent and if the decompression steps are not respected during the ascent, the balance between the dissolved gas and the tissues (including blood) is disrupted, leading to a gaseous release in the organism. Depending on the magnitude of this gaseous release, free gas can occur in blood and tissue. Venous or arterial gas embolism can also occur as a consequence of decompression sickness or barotraumatism. It can also induce drowsiness that consequently leads to drowning. As a result, the occurrence of gas in dead scuba divers is very complex to interpret, as is the difficulty to distinguish it from resuscitation maneuver artifacts or body decomposition. Although the literature is scarce in this domain, significant work has been done to provide a precise intracadaveric gas sampling method to enlighten the cause and circumstances of death during the dive. The aim of this study is to obtain higher statistical significance by collecting a number of cases to confirm the gas sampling protocol and analysis and gain more information about the cause of death and the events surrounding the fatality through the establishment of clear management guidelines

Design space exploration and optimization of path oblivious RAM in secure processors

Keeping user data private is a huge problem both in cloud computing and computation outsourcing. One paradigm to achieve data privacy is to use tamper-resistant processors, inside which users' private data is decrypted and computed upon. These processors need to interact with untrusted external memory. Even if we encrypt all data that leaves the trusted processor, however, the address sequence that goes off-chip may still leak information. To prevent this address leakage, the security community has proposed ORAM (Oblivious RAM). ORAM has mainly been explored in server/file settings which assume a vastly different computation model than secure processors. Not surprisingly, naïvely applying ORAM to a secure processor setting incurs large performance overheads. In this paper, a recent proposal called Path ORAM is studied. We demonstrate techniques to make Path ORAM practical in a secure processor setting. We introduce background eviction schemes to prevent Path ORAM failure and allow for a performance-driven design space exploration. We propose a concept called super blocks to further improve Path ORAM's performance, and also show an efficient integrity verification scheme for Path ORAM. With our optimizations, Path ORAM overhead drops by 41.8%, and SPEC benchmark execution time improves by 52.4% in relation to a baseline configuration. Our work can be used to improve the security level of previous secure processors.National Science Foundation (U.S.). Graduate Research Fellowship Program (Grant 1122374)American Society for Engineering Education. National Defense Science and Engineering Graduate FellowshipUnited States. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (Clean-slate design of Resilient, Adaptive, Secure Hosts Contract N66001-10-2-4089

Lightweight and Secure PUF Key Storage Using Limits of Machine Learning

13th International Workshop, Nara, Japan, September 28 – October 1, 2011. ProceedingsA lightweight and secure key storage scheme using silicon Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) is described. To derive stable PUF bits from chip manufacturing variations, a lightweight error correction code (ECC) encoder / decoder is used. With a register count of 69, this codec core does not use any traditional error correction techniques and is 75% smaller than a previous provably secure implementation, and yet achieves robust environmental performance in 65nm FPGA and 0.13μ ASIC implementations. The security of the syndrome bits uses a new security argument that relies on what cannot be learned from a machine learning perspective. The number of Leaked Bits is determined for each Syndrome Word, reducible using Syndrome Distribution Shaping. The design is secure from a min-entropy standpoint against a machine-learning-equipped adversary that, given a ceiling of leaked bits, has a classification error bounded by ε. Numerical examples are given using latest machine learning results

Fabrication and operation of a two-dimensional ion-trap lattice on a high-voltage microchip

Microfabricated ion traps are a major advancement towards scalable quantum computing with trapped ions. The development of more versatile ion-trap designs, in which tailored arrays of ions are positioned in two dimensions above a microfabricated surface, will lead to applications in fields as varied as quantum simulation, metrology and atom–ion interactions. Current surface ion traps often have low trap depths and high heating rates, because of the size of the voltages that can be applied to them, limiting the fidelity of quantum gates. Here we report on a fabrication process that allows for the application of very high voltages to microfabricated devices in general and use this advance to fabricate a two-dimensional ion-trap lattice on a microchip. Our microfabricated architecture allows for reliable trapping of two-dimensional ion lattices, long ion lifetimes, rudimentary shuttling between lattice sites and the ability to deterministically introduce defects into the ion lattice

Anti-counterfeiting: Mixing the Physical and the Digital World

In this paper, we overview a set of desiderata for building digital anti-counterfeiting technologies that rely upon the difficulty of manufacturing randomized complex 3D objects. Then, we observe how this set is addressed by RF-DNA, an anti-counterfeiting technology recently proposed by DeJean and Kirovski. RF-DNA constructs certificates of authenticity as random objects that exhibit substantial uniqueness in the electromagnetic domain

A Fourier Analysis Based Attack against Physically Unclonable Functions

Electronic payment systems have leveraged the advantages offered by the RFID technology, whose security is promised to be improved by applying the notion of Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs). Along with the evolution of PUFs, numerous successful attacks against PUFs have been proposed in the literature. Among these are machine learning (ML) attacks, ranging from heuristic approaches to provable algorithms, that have attracted great attention. Our paper pursues this line of research by introducing a Fourier analysis based attack against PUFs. More specifically, this paper focuses on two main aspects of ML attacks, namely being provable and noise tolerant. In this regard, we prove that our attack is naturally integrated into a provable Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) model. Moreover, we show that our attacks against known PUF families are effective and applicable even in the presence of noise. Our proof relies heavily on the intrinsic properties of these PUF families, namely arbiter, Ring Oscillator (RO), and Bistable Ring (BR) PUF families. We believe that our new style of ML algorithms, which take advantage of the Fourier analysis principle, can offer better measures of PUF security